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Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System
Contributor(s): Adler, E. Scott (Author)

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ISBN: 0226007561     ISBN-13: 9780226007564
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
OUR PRICE: $36.75  

Binding Type: Paperback
Published: June 2002
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Annotation: For decades, advocates of congressional reforms have repeatedly attempted to clean up the House committee system, which has been called inefficient, outmoded, unaccountable, and even corrupt. Yet these efforts result in little if any change, as members of Congress continually obstruct what could fairly be called innocuous reforms.
What lies behind the House's resistance to change? Challenging recent explanations, Scott Adler contends that legislators resist rearranging committee powers and jurisdictions for the same reason they cling to other aspects of House structure-the ambition for reelection. The system's structure works to the members' advantage, helping them obtain funding (and favor) in their districts. Using extensive evidence from three major reform periods-the 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s-Adler shows that the reelection motive is still the most important underlying factor in determining the outcome of committee reforms, and he explains why committee reform in the House has never succeeded and probably never will.

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Additional Information
BISAC Categories:
- Political Science | American Government - Legislative Branch
Dewey: 328.730
LCCN: 2002018969
Series: American Politics & Political Economy (Paperback)
Physical Information: 0.61" H x 8.98" W x 6.12" L (0.85 lbs) 263 pages
Features: Bibliography, Illustrated, Index
 
Descriptions, Reviews, Etc.
Publisher Description:
For decades, advocates of congressional reforms have repeatedly attempted to clean up the House committee system, which has been called inefficient, outmoded, unaccountable, and even corrupt. Yet these efforts result in little if any change, as members of Congress who are generally satisfied with existing institutions repeatedly obstruct what could fairly be called innocuous reforms.

What lies behind the House's resistance to change? Challenging recent explanations of this phenomenon, Scott Adler contends that legislators resist rearranging committee powers and jurisdictions for the same reason they cling to the current House structure--the ambition for reelection. The system's structure works to the members' advantage, helping them obtain funding (and favor) in their districts. Using extensive evidence from three major reform periods--the 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s--Adler shows that the reelection motive is still the most important underlying factor in determining the outcome of committee reforms, and he explains why committee reform in the House has never succeeded and probably never will.

 
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