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Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons
Contributor(s): Gert, Joshua (Author)

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 ISBN: 0199657548     ISBN-13: 9780199657544
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
OUR PRICE: $93.10  

Binding Type: Hardcover - See All Available Formats & Editions
Published: December 2012
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Additional Information
BISAC Categories:
- Philosophy | Ethics & Moral Philosophy
- Philosophy | Metaphysics
- Philosophy | Mind & Body
Dewey: 170.44
LCCN: 2012532286
Physical Information: 0.9" H x 5.6" W x 8.6" L (0.90 lbs) 230 pages
Features: Bibliography, Dust Cover, Index, Table of Contents
 
Descriptions, Reviews, Etc.
Publisher Description:
Joshua Gert presents an original and ambitious theory of the normative. Expressivism and non-reductive realism represent two very widely separated poles in contemporary discussions of normativity. But the domain of the normative is both large and diverse; it includes, for example, the harmful,
the fun, the beautiful, the wrong, and the rational. It would be extremely surprising if either expressivism or non-reductive realism managed to capture all--or even the most important--phenomena associated with all of these notions. Normative Bedrock defends a response-dependent account of the
normative that accommodates the kind of variation in response that some non-reductive realists downplay or ignore, but that also allows for the sort of straightforward talk of normative properties, normative truth, and substantive normative disagreement that expressivists have had a hard time
respecting.
One of the distinctive features of Gert's approach is his reliance, throughout, on an analogy between color properties and normative properties. He argues that the appropriate response to a given instance of a normative property may often depend significantly on the perspective one takes on that
instance: for example, whether one views it as past or future. Another distinctive feature of Normative Bedrock is its focus on the basic normative property of practical irrationality, rather than on the notion of a normative reason or the notion of the good. This simple shift of focus allow for a
more satisfying account of the link between reasons and motivation, and helps to explain why and how some reasons can justify far more than they can require, and why we therefore need two strength values to characterize the normative capacities of practical reasons.
 
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